The Ethiopian Conflict Explained

On 4^th November, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, launched a military operation against a non-state group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), sparking a non-international armed conflict in the country. This offensive was undertaken after the TPLF attacked federal military units in the region.^[1]  Owing to a media blackout, it is not possible to calculate the exact extent of casualties however it is clear that thousands of people have been killed by the violence, millions have been internally displaced, and around 50,000 have fled to neighbouring Sudan.^[2] This post will analyse and explain the nature of the conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL) focusing on; its classification, the applicable rules and norms and their violations.

A Historical Look at the Conflict

The roots of the crisis in the Tigray region go back to 2018. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power that year replacing the then-ruling coalition, which had been in power since 1991 and was dominated by the TPLF. The 41-year-old former lieutenant colonel’s tenure has largely been hailed a success. He was praised for reforming a repressive governance system, releasing thousands of political prisoners, taking steps to improve the relationship between government and opposition groups, and increasing the number of women in the cabinet.^[3] He also received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 in recognition of his efforts to heal relations with Eritrea, which had shared hostile relations with Ethiopia ever since gaining independence in 1993.  However, he has been unable to heal disputes within his own country.

The rift between him and the Tigray was deepened by Abiy postponing elections due to coronavirus. Tigrayan leaders held their own election anyway but Abiy refused to recognise the results. Ethiopian lawmakers have also withheld federal funding for Tigray which has added to their suffering amidst significant pre-existing humanitarian challenges in the region.^[4] If the conflict escalates further, the UN estimates that nearly nine million people will be at high risk in the region due to food insecurity and internal displacement.^[5]

The conflict under International Humanitarian Law

• • An “International” or “Non-international” armed conflict?
    Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the laws concerning international armed conflicts are applicable on armed conflicts between two or more states.^[6] As the TPLF is a non-state actor and there is no conflict between states, the situation is not that of an international armed conflict.For a non-international armed conflict, there are two main requirements as held by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its judgment in the Tadić case.^[7]

1. 1. First, there must be a sufficient degree of intensity in hostilities between the parties. The Tribunal’s jurisprudence indicates that this can be gauged, inter alia, by the weapons employed, duration, and severity beyond internal tensions, the number of fighters and type of forces participating in the fighting and the number of military and civilian casualties.^[8]
   2. Second, the violence must be conducted by government forces and one or more non-state armed groups or between armed groups. The armed group(s) involved must display the organisational capability of sustaining military operations so they can be considered “parties” to the conflict. This can be indicated, inter alia, by a hierarchical command structure, the group’s ability to plan and launch coordinated military operations, and their capacity to recruit, train and equip combatants.^[9]

These criteria stand satisfied in the case of Ethiopia’s conflict with the TPLF. The TPLF possesses a capacity to exercise effective control, a command structure and access to weapons.^[10]  Moreover, the TPLF has been training and arming its regional forces since 2018.^[11] The International Crisis Group reports that the “Tigray has a large paramilitary force and a well-drilled local militia, thought to number perhaps 250,000 troops combined”, demonstrating its huge military and organisational capability rendering it a party to this non-international armed conflict.^[12] This satisfies the organisation requirement.

There were reports that many federal troops were killed and wounded in the fighting when the TPLF attacked on November 4. Furthermore, the TPLF possesses surface-to-air missile systems, and has launched these rockets as far as at the Eritrean capital, Asmara. The Ethiopian government claims that the present conflict is a “law-enforcement operation”, but the use of military rather than police forces and the severity of hostility indicates that this conflict is more than mere internal disturbances.^[13] Ethiopia’s deputy army chief has himself stated that there had been months of continued provocations and incitement of violence by the TPLF, indicating protracted hostilities. Hence, the second prong, namely that of intensity of violence, also stands satisfied and this is a non-international armed conflict.

While there are certain ‘international’ elements to the conflict – namely the fact that the TPLF has launched rockets at Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, and the fact that Eritrea has sent troops and tanks over the border into Tigray to support the Ethiopian government, these are not enough to ‘internationalise’ the conflict which remains a NIAC.

• • Applicable IHL
    A non-international armed conflict is governed in IHL by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II to which Ethiopia is also a party.^[14] However, Additional Protocol II does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, including riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature. Therefore, there is a threshold that must be met in order for a NIAC to be established. As already discussed, the fact that there were protracted hostilities which were of sufficient intensity demonstrates that the conflict was definitely more than isolated and sporadic acts of violence. This threshold stands met in the current conflict and the applicable law remains Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II as well as customary IHL.This includes the following rules:

1. 1. Under Common Article 3, civilians have a right to humane treatment.^[15] The Ethiopian government is obliged to ensure that the rights to food, water, health, housing, and education are met even during a situation of emergency and armed conflict.
   2. Under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, the principle of distinction allows that only combatants and military objectives should be targeted in an armed conflict, civilians and civilian objects may not be targeted.
   3. The principle of proportionality, under Article 51(5)(b) Additional Protocol I, requires that an attack should not cause loss of civilian life or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated from the attack.
   4. The principle of precaution under Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I requires that all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

• • Violations of Humanitarian law
    Deprose Muchena, Amnesty International’s Director for East and Southern Africa, has confirmed the massacre of a very large number of civilians, who appear to have been day labourers in no way involved in the ongoing military offensive. It is evident that civilians are being targeted indiscriminately.^[16] There are reports that both the TPLF and Ethiopia’s administration are actively obstructing the passage of aid and relief supplies.Moreover, the BBC reports that the TPFL has restricted travel in multiple areas and bombed four bridges in Mekele, which already faces a water shortage, further restricting access to clean water.^[17] Whilst bridges may be legitimate military targets, any excessive injury caused to civilians (such as through water shortages) may violate the principle of proportionality. Similarly blocking communication through internet and phone shutdown may serve a legitimate military purpose, such as denying belligerent forces (in this case, the TPLF) a means of communicating with one another and carrying out the attacks.^[18] However, this step by the Ethiopian government is not proportionate or justified to communications blackout hindering updates for civilians about safety considerations, access to medical facilities, and sources of food and shelter.The UN has also warned that people displaced due to refugee camp bombings are also inaccessible and face a threat to their lives.^[19] On November 18^th, the International Committee of the Red Cross claimed that three ambulances run by the Ethiopian Red Cross were attacked, violating the right to access hospital treatment and healthcare.^[20] The African Union’s “Kampala Convention”, to which Ethiopia is a party, obliges the state to allow the relevant agencies to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. The Ethiopian government has failed to provide any such protection and is on the verge of becoming a major refugee exodus.
    As mentioned, the laws of war obligate armed parties to give “effective advance warning” of attacks that may affect the civilian population.^[21] On November 6, after carrying out initial airstrikes in the Tigray region, Prime Minister Abiy warned Tigray residents to “limit group movement in cities.” On November 22, an Ethiopian military warned residents “to save themselves” in Mekelle. TPLF officials have also carried out rocket attacks in Eritrea after warning that it would retaliate.^[22] It is debatable, however, whether a communication blackout could really guarantee a timely warning.

• • Accountability
    The International Criminal Court (ICC) is mandated to investigate, charge, and try people suspected of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. However, Ethiopia is not a state party to the Rome Statute, the governing ICC treaty. The United Nations Security Council could refer the situation to the court.^[23] While the UN has been quick to issue statements and chair meetings, its timely action still remains a question. This may change though if the refugee crisis spills into the region potentially destabilising the entire Horn of Africa region.

The way forward

It is hoped that Abiy will employ a similar approach to de-escalate tensions within Ethiopia as was used when ending the war with Eritrea. He had said at the time that ‘Love is greater than modern weapons, tanks and missiles.’^[24] The adoption of this strategy, premised on dialogue and diplomacy, within his own country would be beneficial for the scores of people affected by the conflict who risk becoming refugees. Failure to do so may destabilise the entire region and fuel further separatist groups in Ethiopia. It is important for Ethiopia’s affected civilians, who face a conflict as well as a plague of locusts and the coronavirus,^[25] that a peaceful resolution to this conflict is found.

Cover image: Eduardo Soteras/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

——— References ———

[1] 10 Conflicts to Watch in 2021, Robert Malley < https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2021 >

[2] Urgent support needed to help Ethiopian refugees reaching Sudan (UNHCR) < https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/11/5fb78cec4/urgent-support-needed-help-ethiopian-refugees-reaching-sudan.html >

[3] Ibid 5

[4] Ibid 8

[5] Ethiopia: Tigray Region Humanitarian Update, Situation Report No. 1 < https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ethiopia_situation_report_no.1_tigray_humanitarian_update_7_november_2020.pdf>

[6] See Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and Non-international armed conflict in Ethiopia, RULAC < https://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflict-in-ethiopia#collapse2accord >

[7]   Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999

[8] See Dustin A. Lewis, Gabriella Blum & Naz K. Modirzadeh, Indefinite War: Unsettled International Law on the End of Armed Conflict (Harvard Law School Program on Int’l Law & Armed Conflict, Feb. 2017)

[9] Ibid

[10] Ethiopia: Tigray leader confirms bombing Eritrean capital, Al Jazeera < https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/15/rockets-fired-from-ethiopias-tigray-region-hit-eritrean-capital >

[11] Non-international armed conflict < https://www.rulac.org/classification/non-international-armed-conflicts >

[12] Ethiopia ‘at war’ with leaders of Tigray region, military declares < https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-civil-war-tigray-tplf-abiy-latest-b1627418.html >

[13] Ibid 1

[14] Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609

[15] The Tigrayan Conflict and the Laws of Humanitarian Assistance, David Matyas < https://opiniojuris.org/2020/11/20/the-tigrayan-conflict-and-the-laws-of-humanitarian-assistance/ >

[16] Ethiopia: Investigation reveals evidence that scores of civilians were killed in massacre in Tigray state < https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/ethiopia-investigation-reveals-evidence-that-scores-of-civilians-were-killed-in-massacre-in-tigray-state/ >

[17] The Tigrayan Conflict and the Laws of Humanitarian Assistance, David Matyas < https://opiniojuris.org/2020/11/20/the-tigrayan-conflict-and-the-laws-of-humanitarian-assistance/

[18] Q&A: Conflict in Ethiopia and International Law, Human Rights Watch < https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/25/qa-conflict-ethiopia-and-international-law# >

[19] Insecurity and bureaucracy hampering aid to Ethiopia’s Tigray region < https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082052 >

[20] Ibid

[21] Ethiopia: Investigation reveals evidence that scores of civilians were killed in massacre in Tigray state
< https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/ethiopia-investigation-reveals-evidence-that-scores-of-civilians-were-killed-in-massacre-in-tigray-state/ >

[22] Ibid 23

[23] Investigation reveals evidence that scores of civilians were killed in massacre in Tigray state
< https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/ethiopia-investigation-reveals-evidence-that-scores-of-civilians-were-killed-in-massacre-in-tigray-state/ >

[24] https://twitter.com/newint/status/1043142709286973442

[25] Ethiopia: Safe access and swift action needed for refugees in Tigray < https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082162 >