Pakistan has only recently managed to delay (if not avert) an economic default courtesy of certain friends in the Arab Gulf and all-weather strategic cooperative ally China; but beyond this ‘success’ and the domestic political unrest that would still remain a cause of concern for foreign investors, there looms a long-term threat that has been ignored by every regime in Islamabad. Despite its status as a prominent littoral country in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Pakistan has been deliberately excluded from relevant multi-stakeholder forums, most importantly the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Last year, I examined the dangers of this predicament in detail and also proposed a policy roadmap that could help the powers-that-be to take the (much delayed) initiative to set the ball rolling and circumvent India’s persistent veto.
Presently, there are two differing camps on the issue of IOR’s security: one justifies the dominating influence of Western extra-regional maritime forces who believe in propping up India as the regional watchdog to restrict a rising China’s entry, and another that is more tolerant or non-confrontational; member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and island countries in the IOR are included in the latter camp alongside Pakistan.
Genesis of Pakistan’s Ignorance in the IOR
One of the primary reasons for Pakistan’s continued exclusion from recognised IOR forums is the country’s intrinsic lack of maritime culture; excluding the former capital city Karachi, there is no other mentionable port city that evokes even a semblance of nostalgia for merchant shipping and seafaring. Historically, Pakistan has presented itself as an agrarian economy that is focused on the hinterlands (fertile plains, irrigated deserts, green mountains) to sustain food production and facilitate settlements along rivers and streams, even though this status has long withered. From a security viewpoint, all conflicts with neighbouring countries have occurred along land borders in the west and east, excluding handful examples of naval aggression by India. A decade plus of counter terrorism cooperation with foreign military forces vis à vis Afghanistan post 9/11 reinforced the country’s default inclination toward continental policymaking. Demographic maps of the country also confirm that an overwhelming segment of the population lives in upper provinces and territories.
A second reason could be that since Pakistan has not faced any potent naval threat in the 21st century, except for occasional Indian force signalling through submarines, it remains satisfied with the development of ‘strategic’ assets which it believes could serve as a credible standoff capability in a strictly traditional military engagement. However, its responses to hybrid aggression from the high seas are not known because they have never been discussed, at least within the Parliament.
Plausible Maritime Threats to Geoeconomic Interests
Let us take a look at some hypothetical but plausible futuristic scenarios of coercion by an assertive Indian union government which aims to puncture Pakistan’s seaborne trade:-
Scenario 1: The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) interdicts and seizes commercial ships operating along the Maritime Silk Route (MSR) in the Western IOR on frivolous charges of piracy, since it is a law enforcement agency and keeps the escalation bar lower as compared to the deployment of Indian Navy assets. Repeated acts of merchant harassment and unnecessary provocations reduce port calls to Karachi and Gwadar and run the risk of perception in China as a ‘Pakistan-specific problem’. It would be costly and unwise for vessels coming from the Eastern IOR/ Western Pacific to take the longer route avoiding the Laccadive Sea and waters off the Indian state of Gujarat.
Scenario 2: India’s aircraft carriers may or may not suffice for combat operations but for the record, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) Rafales and Su-30MKI jets have already validated the conduct of long-range missions through mid-air refuelling in the IOR. If India launches precision missiles to take out aviation-support bases in Sindh from Porbandar, for example, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Navy (PN) will find it extremely difficult to mobilise aviation assets in response. Moreover, there is no information available to evaluate Pakistan’s air combat potential in the high seas. Will Pakistan launch missiles as its first and last responses, thereby discrediting its conventional warfighting capabilities in the region?
Scenario 3: A pro-India political regime comes to power in one of the IOR island countries which is not unusual, as examined in Bertil Lintner’s The Costliest Pearl. Similar diplomatic-cum-defence influence efforts are persistently ongoing in East African countries, particularly Kenya and Tanzania. One or more of these countries abruptly disengage from or sever geoeconomic relations with China, rendering some of the shipping routes to and from Pakistan as obsolete. In this scenario, Pakistan has little to no influence potential to reclaim its loss, let alone mediate on behalf of China which is viciously being presented as a so-called ‘aggressor’ in the region. India and especially its extra-regional patrons (notably Japan, the US and France) are making concerted efforts to discredit political leaders in IOR littoral countries who welcome China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through propaganda campaigns or active support for opposition elements. The Maldives and Sri Lanka are two noteworthy examples where the latter is played out.
Scenario 4: A more radical recipe for instigation, with plausible deniability, could involve India going the gray-zone route and developing a maritime militia posing as fishermen to create problems at sea for marine traffic to and from outer fringes of Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. These distributed pockets of seaborne militias may be deputed during conflict for distracting People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) vessels approaching for support from Djibouti thus disabling joint PLAN-PN defence against an Indian naval blockade of commercial shipping, similar to Operation Trident (1971). In this scenario, while PAF and PN may have the legal right to defend against naval assault, responses to apparently ‘civilian fishermen’ (gray-zone militia) will need to be very carefully deliberated since the authority to conduct ‘hot pursuit’ against them will become legally impossible once they have returned to their sovereign territorial waters or those of a third country.
Diplomacy-Conflict Management in the IOR
Pakistan-India conflict does not always stay bilateral and has historically invited extra-regional powers to mediate, primarily the US, which places IORA at the centre of its ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy in the IOR; this was reaffirmed during a recent meeting between US Deputy Secretary of State Richard R. Verma and IORA Secretary General Salman Al Farisi. Research shows that since the beginning of this year, India has further amplified its rhetoric to promote synthesis between Indian and Pacific Oceans by including it in Quad discussions and leading the development of IORA’s Indo-Pacific Outlook, appreciated by the US.
Another key lookout for Pakistan is the deepening strategic relations of India with France which was recently manifested in the form of an India-France Indo-Pacific Roadmap and includes extensive maritime security and space cooperation in the IOR. A few months ago, the IAF’s French-origin Rafales participated in their first overseas exercise, ORION, which validated interoperability with the French Air and Space Forces in the region for future joint operations. Similarly, India also participated alongside the UK and fellow Quad members (Australia, US and Japan) in French Navy’s exercise LA PEROUSE held in the IOR.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s security policymakers may proffer that the country does not foresee significant ‘military threat’ from the high seas, in the strictest sense of the term. The geostrategic maneuverings by extra-regional powers and India to form zones of influence in the IOR are destined to create an environment that is disadvantageous to China’s economic expansion, indirectly threatening the raison d’être of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
In their typical long-termist fashion, Chinese policymakers foresaw these risks and activated economic diplomacy on a war-footing, even using their clout to secure a stake in IORA. Pakistan, a key node in the BRI and MSR, remains either myopic or unwilling to do the same.
The defence against this long-term threat eventually lies in maritime force buildup but the means to deter maritime conflict are achievable only through national political will/ concensus and proactive multi-dimensional (cultural, social, economic) diplomacy. Membership of IORA should therefore be included among Pakistan’s foreign policy priorities.
