Israel’s war on Gaza on the pretext of annihilating Hamas has not only led to the massacre of thousands of ordinary Palestinians, it has also (expectedly) generated ripples in the geostrategic continuum.
What was planned as a localised ‘war of attrition’ has, knowingly or otherwise, graduated to a phenomenon that plays out on a regional theatre level involving multiple countries. The domains of conflict, apart from land, air, cyberspace and outer space, now also include the sea. Factually, the State of Israel and its military supporters have become party to an all-domain (read: beyond multi-domain) conflict that could have been handled more effectively through clandestine operations; that is, if the true ulterior motive was to ‘defeat Hamas’. Ariel Sharon was among the first to employ the strategy of target killing terrorist group leaders, successfully taking several of them down with noticeable attempts to minimise collateral damage.
The theatre-level effects of this conflict are not confined to the Mediterranean Sea. They transcend mere geographical constraints by virtue of political, diplomatic and economic interdependencies and can be felt south till the waters of the Red Sea and the broader Indian Ocean Region (IOR) where a future standoff involving pro or anti-China maritime forces is more a question of ‘when’ as compared to ‘if’.
Israel’s frenzied leadership had apparently forgotten that Iran, a malign stakeholder in this conflict, does not rely solely on groups operating to their north and east; its sphere of influence includes the Houthis in Yemen who frustrated efforts at elimination by the combined military might of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Sensing an opportunity to reassert their defiance, the Houthis have activated a flashpoint in the Bab el Mandeb Strait with apparently two broad goals:
- Extend the security threat canvas for Israel and its military supporters by absorbing not one but three American theatre commands (Europe, Africa and Central). By doing so, the Houthis and by extension their patrons in Iran aim to: (i) raise the costs of war for countries involved, (ii) create a vacuum for US forces in Iraq and divert Israeli focus away from Syria and Lebanon, (iii) test the efficacy of asymmetric warfare arsenal developed indigenously by Iran and, perhaps, more importantly, (iv) raise the prestige of Iranian power before oppressed Palestinians as a credible alternative to Arab regimes’ failure or indifference to restrain Israel.
- Disrupt global maritime trade by rendering the passage to Suez Canal as ‘high risk’ and forcing reroutes through the Cape of Good Hope. In so doing, commodity and oil prices have already spiked, thus keeping the Gaza issue ‘alive’ and ‘globalised’, much to the chagrin of Israel and frustration of countries which preferred to remain silent spectators to the conflict. Recent estimates suggest that almost 30% of global container trade passes through the Suez Canal, so the geostrategic effects would obviously be of high impact.
Another less-discussed aspect of the Red Sea/ Bab el Mandeb Strait region is its critical role in communications between Europe and Asia; an estimated 99% of internet and financial traffic is routed between these continents through subsea cables passing along this route. Analysts pointedly surmise that the Houthis may find it difficult to engage in subsea sabotage operations of these cables (similar to what happened to Nord Stream-2 in Europe), but admit that should this materialise, cable-patching ships will find it extremely difficult to undertake repair operations because of naval harassment by the Houthis.
While Pakistan has expressed its moral and diplomatic support for the oppressed Palestinians in Gaza by calling for an end to Israel’s genocide, it has also supported South Africa’s petition before the International Court of Justice on the same. Regardless, Pakistan will be strongly impacted by what the Houthis do in the Red Sea so its leadership needs to conduct contingency planning accordingly: –
- National inflation, particularly price per barrel of oil, will continue unabated and become an economic headache for any new elected federal government, thus eroding its immediate popularity.
- From Arab Gulf states, America’s theatre-led naval response to Houthi aggression has only managed to garner support from Bahrain. If Saudi Arabia and the UAE decide they cannot find another way of managing the issue, Pakistan has a high chance of being sucked into the complex. Pakistan Navy has remained at the forefront of three different coalition taskforces in these waters under the auspices of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), but chose to stay clear of the Red Sea tensions on account of its relations with Iran.
- Though Gwadar is still in its infant stages of port operations and has not proven as even a remotely credible substitute for Karachi, the practical demonstration of American-led military force against aggressors in the high seas should generate concerns that commercial container traffic routed from Pakistan under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) banner could one day be curtailed by countries which find common interest in opposing China’s geoeconomic resurgence. Irrespective of the Houthis’ existence, commercial maritime traffic in the Red Sea could be subject to the whims of a ‘non-benevolent’ geopolitical actor. There is a reason why China has started to invest in overland freight trains as a backup to unpredictable maritime flows.
If the past is to serve as guidance, policymakers in Pakistan will hope to sleep over the Red Sea dilemma on the deluded hopes that China will find a way to ‘solve the problem’. So far, the Chinese do not appear to have an appetite for getting involved in dealing with the Houthi menace. Practically, however, the crisis cannot be overlooked with ease. As a partner in USCENTCOM, it has to share a common threat picture with the theatre’s relatively new member, Israel. Pakistan may appear to be indifferent or ‘restrained’ but a recent paper by USCENTCOM’s Combined Strategy Analysis Group includes a Pakistani military officer among its authors; they suggest (with obvious approval of their respective national military institutions) that the US needs to reconsider its existing strategy of vehemently supporting Israel and alienating its regional allies to the benefit of Chinese diplomacy.
Pakistan is evidently hoping for major regional powers to sit together with extra-regional actors like the US to reach a solution while it plays the role of onlooker. It is in a lose-lose dilemma: Since the belligerent (Houthis) is linked to a bordering country (Iran), Pakistan has little to offer. It is also mindful of the fact that China has developed alternatives to CPEC such as the proposed Five Nations Railway Corridor (China-Iran-Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan), the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran Corridor and integrating Belt and Road Initiative with Turkey’s Middle Corridor project. So, ultimately, all it can earnestly hope for is an early cessation to Israeli hostilities. The sincerity in Pakistan’s sympathies for peace in Gaza are not limited to humanitarian considerations, they are also tied to its economic interests.
As discussed earlier, if at some point Saudi Arabia or the UAE (or both) join the US-led anti-Houthi alliance, Pakistan will find it extremely difficult to persist in its passivity, as it is beholden to both for regular financial injections. Consider how India, a strategic investor in Iran’s Chabahar port, has also been forced to share its reservations on the Red Sea’s instability because of economic implications. It has deployed naval forces just east of the Red Sea to respond to threats while abstaining from joining any major regional task force, which is by and large futile since eventual passage to and from the Suez Canal still remains at risk of the Houthis.
Pakistan need not replicate a similar effort for pointless publicity. A more practical workaround would entail revitalisation of overland rail and truck-borne trade via Afghanistan to cater for similar maritime uncertainties in the long-term future; interestingly, Islamabad has done the opposite of promoting goodwill with the government and people of Afghanistan through forced refugee expulsions et cetera. The available recourse is to regularise operations of the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul freight train; China can be asked to facilitate this arrangement as a stop-gap, if not long-term, engagement.
With commerce aside, security support for Arab benefactors remains unresolved. The UAE and Saudi Arabia both, despite being existing and potential recognisers of the State of Israel respectively, are unlikely to partake in a US-led umbrella which would eventually prioritise the South China Sea once the conflict in the Middle East is over and normalcy restored. For Pakistan, therefore, the probability of further awkwardness is very low.
Even if it survives the fallout of passively observing anti-Houthi efforts, Pakistan will have weakened further in terms of its relations with the US; unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia, China and India which are economically strong countries and provide geostrategic benefits to both Washington and Tel Aviv. Hence, for all its apparent efforts at not falling into any camp, Pakistan will further lose its relevance for the existing and upcoming US administrations.
