From Yemen to South Sudan, instances of the intentional deprivation of civilians of objects indispensable to their survival (OIS) are part and parcel of armed conflict.[1] Conflict has left an increasing number of civilians severely food-insecure, as food stocks during conflict are often destroyed or looted, infrastructure necessary for the production and distribution of food damaged and access to agriculture disrupted.[2] In 2017, approximately 60 per cent of the 815 million people suffering from hunger were living in conflict zones.[3] international humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) provide a framework of rules which aim to protect populations from food insecurity as a result of conflict. The international community has also made strides in emphasising the link between conflict and hunger through UNSC Resolution 2417 which condemns the starving of civilians as a method of warfare and calls on parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under IHL.[4] This article discusses the use of starvation as a method of warfare and its status under IHL and ICL using the case studies of Yemen and South Sudan.
Prohibition of Starvation as a Method of Warfare Under IHL
Despite consensus in the 1863 Lieber Code that ‘it is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy’[5] and the routine use of starvation as a weapon in the ‘Age of Extremes’,[6] the prohibition on starvation was first acknowledged by a Committee of representatives nominated by the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and other Powers with special interests in the 1919 Report of the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War. They held that the ‘deliberate starvation of civilians’ was a violation of the laws and customs of war. [7] The prohibition on the use of starvation in international and non-international armed conflicts is now codified in the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions and while the principle was considered novel at the time of the adoption of the Protocols, it has since become a principle of customary IHL.[8]
- International Armed Conflict
Article 54(1) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I)[9] sets out a general prohibition on the use of starvation as a method of warfare in international armed conflicts (IACs). Any method of warfare which has the purpose of causing the starvation of civilians is prohibited.[10] Article 54(2) elaborates that it is prohibited to ‘attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population…for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party’. This prohibition relates to ‘foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works,’ and applies regardless of whether the motive is to starve out civilians or to cause them to move away so long as the purpose of the deprivation is to cause starvation.[11]
- Objects indispensable to survival
The objects which are especially protected under Article 54(2) are to be interpreted in the widest sense to cover the infinite variety of needs of populations in all geographic areas, including heating oil and blankets for example.[12] The inclusion of the term ‘such as’ emphasises that the list of protected objects is illustrative rather than exhaustive.[13]Academic commentators also suggest that starvation may include deprivation of medicines and medical equipment though the IHL rules on medical care[14] will simultaneously apply to such a situation.[15]
- Threshold of need
To amount to starvation under IHL, the deprivation of the civilian population must be to the extent where survival is threatened, though it is not necessary for death to occur.[16]
- Purpose of starvation
It is contested whether the prohibition on starvation applies exclusively to situations where the belligerent has the purpose of starving civilians, or whether it extends to situations where starvation is a foreseeable consequence, though not the intended purpose of a course of action.[17] A narrow interpretation of Article 54, aided by the travaux, would suggest that the prohibition accounts only for the ‘deliberate starvation’ of civilians.[18] However, when Article 54 is viewed in its entirety, in particular with paragraphs 2 and 3, there are situations where conduct may amount to starvation even though it is not carried out with the purpose of starving the civilian population. Supplies of foodstuffs intended for the sole use of the armed forces may be attacked and destroyed and attacks and acts of destruction against protected objects are legitimate when those objects are used in direct support of military action.[19] However, paragraph 3b contains the proviso that ‘in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement’. This suggests that even if the specific purpose of the conduct is not to deny objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such conduct is prohibited if the effect of these actions would cause the starvation or forced movement of civilians and if such an effect is foreseeable.[20]
The inclusion of the specific purpose requirement restricts the use of the prohibition on starvation for attacks undertaken without the requisite purpose, or those directed at legitimate military objectives where OIS are only collaterally impaired.[21] Therefore, where attacks against food markets in a rural area take place and they prevent the population from being able to gather food, failing to prove that the attacks were purposefully directed against the markets will restrict the use of the Article 54 prohibition on starvation.[22] This accountability gap with respect to collateral starvation makes the prohibition on starvation ‘unfit for preventing all instances of man-made famines occurring during conflicts.’[23] Margherita Stevoli suggests that this lacuna be bridged by using the proportionality rule as it does not impose a specific purpose requirement on the attacker and it evaluates collateral damage from attacks directed against military targets.[24]
- As a method of warfare
It must be questioned whether the inclusion of the phrase ‘as a method of warfare’ in Article 54(1) AP I seeks to limit the prohibition to the deliberate infliction of starvation. Akande and Gillard suggest that the phrase simply refers to the fact that starvation is used by the belligerent as a method of fighting and adds no additional requirement that the belligerent must seek to attain a military advantage.[25] Gaggioli and Melzer explain that ‘[t]he notion of methods of warfare should be understood…as referring to any particular manner of using weapons or of otherwise conducting hostilities, irrespective of permissibility or appropriateness.’[26] The term ‘method of warfare’ adds no additional requirement for the prohibition to apply.
- Non-International Armed Conflict
Similar prohibitions relating to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) are contained in Article 14 of Additional Protocol II (AP II).[27] A NIAC has been defined in IHL as ‘protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.’[28] As with IACs, the prohibition on using starvation against civilians in NIACs is a rule from which no derogations may be made as no exception for military necessity was adopted.[29] It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population which are identical to the objects protected in AP I.[30] The provision emphasises certain acts which are prohibited though the list is not exhaustive. Starvation by omission, for example, would also be prohibited.[31]
- Objects indispensable to survival
Similar to Article 54 of AP I, Article 14 of AP II should be interpreted in the widest possible sense to include objects which ‘are of basic importance for the population from the point of view of providing the means of existence.’[32] In addition, Article 14 must be interpreted in line with Articles 17 and 18 of AP II which require that displaced civilians receive ‘satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition’ (Article 17) and access to impartial ‘relief actions’ (Article 18).[33] Therefore, the above objects should also be understood to be protected under Article 14.[34]
- Threshold of need
While not explicitly mentioned in the ICRC commentary, it appears as though the threshold of need for starvation in NIACs would be the same as that in IACs given the overall similarity between Article 54 AP I and Article 14 AP II.
- Purpose of starvation
Article 14 is intended as a simplification of Article 54 AP I,[35] the purpose of which is to prohibit deliberately subjecting people to starvation and to preserve the means of subsistence of civilians.[36] This suggests that the drafters of AP II intended purpose to be an essential element of the prohibition contained in Article 14.[37] Such an interpretation is supported by purposive language in the commentary to Rule 54 of Customary IHL.[38] Similar to purpose in Article 54 AP I, purpose under Article 14 AP II may be direct (for the purpose of causing starvation) or indirect (for the purpose of an action which will result in starvation).
- As a method of combat
While AP I uses the phrase ‘as a method of warfare’, the phrase ‘as a method of combat’ is used in AP II.[39] This is because the Conference considered the term ‘warfare’ inappropriate when referring to conduct in non-international armed conflicts.[40] Though not defined in the Protocol, ‘combat’ should be understood to have the same meaning in AP II as ‘warfare’ does in AP I, that is, starvation is prohibited when ‘used as a weapon to destroy the civilian population.’[41]
Prohibition of Starvation as a Method of Warfare under ICL
- International Armed Conflict
Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute which applies exclusively to IACs, criminalises ‘intentionally using starvation as a method of warfare by depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.’[42] To establish the crime of starvation, it must be proved that the perpetrator deprived civilians of OIS, the perpetrator intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare, the conduct took place in the context of an international armed conflict, and the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.[43]
Given that there has yet to be a prosecution of the war crime of starvation on an international level, elements of accountability for the crime remain largely unexplored.[44] Challenges in prosecution are likely to arise, however, over the precise nature of the intent required for the crime. This is because the actus reus elements of starvation, including the meaning of starvation and depriving civilians of OIS, are relatively straightforward and reflect the corresponding IHL prohibitions. It is unclear whether the court will require knowledge of virtual certainty or evidence of a desire when establishing that a perpetrator intentionally deprived civilians of OIS and intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare. It is likely, though, that the International Criminal Court (ICC) will consider the minimum standards of criminality that the offence seeks to prohibit, the interests that the offence seeks to protect, the drafting history of the amendment and corresponding provisions of IHL from which it has been derived.[45]
- Non-international Armed Conflict
Despite strong evidence that CIL prohibits the international starvation of civilians in both IACs and NIACs, prior to an amendment in the Rome Statute, the prohibition on starvation as a method of warfare against civilians applied only to violations in IACs.[46] In December 2019, however, the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) to the Rome Statute of the ICC unanimously voted to amend the Rome Statute to include starvation as a war crime in NIACs.[47] To satisfy the requirements of the crime of starvation as per Article 8(2)(e)(xix), the perpetrator must have deprived civilians of OIS, the perpetrator must have intended to starve out civilians as a method of warfare, the conduct must have taken place in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character, and the perpetrator must have been aware of factual circumstance that established the existence of of an armed conflict.[48] The amendment was a significant step towards closing the accountability gap created by the distinction between the IACs and NIACs, however, as will be evidenced below, there are still significant impediments in attaining accountability.
Case Studies of the Use of Starvation as a Method of Warfare
Though prohibited under IHL, parties to IACs and NIACs regularly deprive civilians of objects that are essential to their survival, starving them, sometimes to death and are rarely held accountable.
- Yemen
Conflict, economic decline, and institutional collapse have exacerbated the challenges of food insecurity and malnutrition in Yemen.[49] Today, as the Yemen conflict moves into its seventh year, Yemen is the world’s largest food security crisis.[50] The conflict in Yemen between the (internationally recognised) government of Yemen’s armed forces and the Ansar Allah (Houthi) armed group[51] which began in 2014[52] is generally accepted as a NIAC,[53]and is governed by the IHL rules on the prohibition of starvation contained in AP II. Although the Saudi/UAE-led Coalition[54] intervened in the conflict in 2015, the coalition’s involvement does not alter the classification of the conflict from a NIAC because the intervention took place at the request of the government of President Hadi.[55]
The Saudi/UAE-led coalition has repeatedly been accused of attacking, destroying and damaging critical infrastructure which constitute OIS, including food storage sites, electricity supplies and markets, and health facilities.[56] Airstrikes by the coalition on the Jalhouf and Al-Taweel farms, on Al-Nashoor and Al-Hamazat water facilities and on fishing boats near Al-Badeaa’ and Awaban islands are in violation of Article 14 of AP II and Rule 54 of Customary IHL as the objects are OIS, have civilian status and were destroyed for the purpose of starving the civilian population.[57] Ansar Allah has also been accused of unlawful attacks on OIS.[58] During the conflict, Ansar Allah shelled civilian vehicles laden with food and planted land mines in civilian areas. Both activities targeted OIS and had the purpose of depriving civilians of food, agricultural land and essential firewood, thereby starving them in violation of Article 14 of AP II.[59]
Despite investigations into alleged violations of IHL related to starvation in Yemen which document likely perpetrators,[60] and call for parties to the conflict to remove restrictions and cease attacks on OIS,[61] there is a significant accountability gap with respect to violations of IHL and ICL committed in Yemen.[62] Since the starvation crimes have been committed in Yemen and Yemen is not a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC would only have jurisdiction over starvation crimes committed in Yemen if the UN Security Council referred the situation to the ICC under universal jurisdiction.[63] In the past, the situations in Darfur and Libya have been referred to the ICC,[64] however, it is unlikely that the same will take place with Yemen as members of the UN Security Council have assisted airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led Coalition through arms sales.[65] In addition, de facto authorities and international actors are unwilling to admit to potential violations or to take remedial action.[66] The creation of a stand-alone mechanism or ad-hoc tribunal for Yemen may be a solution to the impunity pandemic but requires political will which is not currently present especially given the HRC’s recent decision not to renew the Group of Eminent Experts on Yemen’s (GEE) mandate.
- South Sudan
Despite possessing some of the most agriculturally productive land in the world, civil war in South Sudan has created a humanitarian crisis leading to the displacement of nearly 4 million people.[67] In the 1983-2005 civil war, the Government of Sudan, allied militia, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) regularly used starvation as a method of war.[68] Combatants destroyed food, farmland, livestock herds and also prevented desperate people from foraging for wild food or finding casual labour resulting in one of the highest mortality rates ever recorded in modern times.[69] Not too long after the 2003 ceasefire, the 2013 multi-sided civil war (NIAC) exacerbated the starvation crisis.
In its most recent report, the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan[70] found that the food insecurity and malnutrition witnessed in the region has primarily been caused by flooding and starvation as a method of warfare.[71]The Commission reported that government forces used ‘starvation as a method of warfare in Western Bahr el-Ghazal (between January 2017 and November 2018) and Jonglei (between 2017 and 2019) States.’[72] Government forces sought to punish minority ethnic communities, including the Balanda Boor (Fertit) and Luo communities whom government forces perceived as being sympathetic to the opposition by depriving them of goods indispensable to their survival, including harvests (sorghum, cassava and okra) and livestock (chicken, cattle and goats).[73] This is reported to be part of a widespread attack against civilians in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State,[74] indirectly satisfying the purposive requirement of Article 14 AP II as the government sought to persecute the communities through starvation. Members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) also deliberately obstructed the activities of aid organisations in Equatoria in 2018 by preventing them from delivering OIS to communities in need.[75]
The Commissions’ findings that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Government of South Sudan engaged in acts amounting to serious violations of IHL during armed conflict in Central Equatoria,[76] brings the possibility of accountability through the formation of an International Tribunal to try crimes committed in South Sudan. While the Commission urges the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity to ensure timely investigation of the violations of IHL committed by the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF), the National Security Service and other security force members, it will be hard to escape the pattern of impunity in the region.
Conclusion
Despite growing concern over food insecurity in conflict areas and the recognition of IHL and ICL rules as ‘lines of defence’ against starvation in armed conflict, accountability is difficult to achieve. The prohibition on starvation under IHL and the war crime of starvation in ICL fail to account for the many situations where warring parties do not pursue policies whose direct or indirect purpose is starving civilians, allowing cases of collateral famine to slip through the cracks. Additionally, where clear violations of IHL and ICL have been committed, it is often impossible to identify a clear perpetrator, restricting the viability of accountability procedures.[77] To address this, it is imperative to have a wider discussion on the obligations of parties to an armed conflict which are broader than those acts which result in individual criminal responsibility,[78] and to leverage IHL and ICL concepts to fill lacunas in the law. Finally, the international community must elevate the public and political profile of the crime to make it so morally deplorable that its usage is no longer normalised.[79] This will build political pressure to fight impunity for starvation as a method of warfare.
References
[1] UNSC Verbatim Record (12 October 2017) UN Doc S/PV.8069, 2
[2] UNSC Res. 2417 (24 May 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2417(2018)
[3] UNSC Verbatim Record (n 1)
[4] UNSC Res. 2417 (n 2), 2
[5] Instructions for the Governments of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code) (24 April 1863), Art. 17
[6] Coined by historian, Eric Hobsbawn to refer to the time period from World War I to the end of the Cold War (1914-1991); See Alex de Waal, ‘Armed Conflict And The Challenge Of Hunger: Is An End In Sight?’, Global Hunger Index (Welthungerhilfe, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Concern Worldwide 2015), 24 https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/129681
[7] Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. (1920). The American Journal of International Law, 14(1/2), 95–154. https://doi.org/10.2307/2187841
[8] Rule 53, ICRC Customary IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule53
[9] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979), 1125 UNTS 3, (AP I), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf
[10] Dapo Akande, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Conflict-induced Food Insecurity and the War Crime of Starvation of Civilians as a Method of Warfare: The Underlying Rules of International Humanitarian Law’ (2019) 17 Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, 753–779, 758 https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqz050
[11] Art. 54(2) AP I
[12] Akande & Gillard (n 10), 759
[13] Commentary of 1987: Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population (ICRC Commentary to APs), p.655, 2102-2103, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=6377CFD2C9D23F39C12563CD00434C81
[14] Wounded and sick civilians and fighters are entitled to receive to the fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay the medical care and attention required by their condition, See Art. 12, 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I); Art. 12, 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition ofWounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II); Art. 10 AP I
[15] Akande & Gillard (n 10), 760
[16] Akande & Gillard (n 10), 761
[17] Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Seventy Years of the Geneva Conventions, What of the Future?’ (March 2020), International Law Programme Chatham House Briefing, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ7919-Geneva-Conventions-BP-200324.pdf
[18] ‘[t]he term “starvation” is generally understood by everyone. To use it as a method of warfare would be to provoke it deliberately, causing the population to suffer hunger, particularly by depriving it of its sources of food or of supplies.’ ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.653, para 2089
[19] Art. 54(3), AP I
[20] Akande & Gillard (n 10), 764
[21] Margherita Stevoli, ‘Famine As A Collateral Damage Of War’ (2020) 11 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, 171
[22] Stevoli (n 22)
[23] Stevoli (n 22), 172
[24] Stevoli (n 22), 173
[25] Akande & Gillard (n 10), 765
[26] Gloria Gaggioli and Nils Melzer, ‘Methods Of Warfare’, Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law (OUP 2020)
[27] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978), 1125 UNTS 609, (AP II), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/protocol2.pdf
[28] Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction (2 October 1995) para. 70
[29] ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1456, para 4795
[30] Art. 14, AP II
[31] ‘To deliberately decide not to take measures to supply the population with objects indispensable for its survival in a way would become a method of combat by default, and would be prohibited under this article’: ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1457, para 4800
[32] ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1457, para 4803
[33] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance, ‘Starvation Makers: the use of starvation by warring parties in Yemen’ (September 2021), 88 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Starvation-Makers-2021-En.pdf
[34] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34); ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1456, para 4791
[35] Laura Graham, Pathways to Accountability for Starvation Crimes in Yemen (2021), 53 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L., 418
[36] ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1456, para 4791
[37] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34), 86; ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1456, para 4791
[38] Rule 54, ICRC Customary IHL Database, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54
[39] Art.14, AP II
[40] ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1457, para 4799
[41] ICRC Commentary to the APs, p.1457, para 4799
[42] Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17 1998) 2187 U.N.T.S. 9
[43] Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), Elements of Crimes 31 (2001), International Criminal Court
[44] Global Rights Compliance, ‘The Crime of Starvation and Methods of Prosecution and Accountability, Accountability for Mass Starvation: Testing the Limits of the Law’ (2019), Policy Paper #1, 4
[45] Global Rights Compliance (n 45), 15
[46] Global Rights Compliance, ‘The Netherlands Accepts Starvation Amendment: One Year On’ (11 December 2020), https://www.globalrightscompliance.com/en/news/the-netherlands-accepts-starvation-amendment-one-year-on
[47] Global Rights Compliance (n 45)
[48] Resolution on amendments to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (6 December 2019), Resolution ICC-ASP/18/Res.5, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/ICC-ASP-18-Res5-ENG.pdf, Annex II
[49] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34), 65
[50] OCHA, ‘Yemen: 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview’ (November 2015), 7 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2016_HNO_English_%20FINAL.pdf
[51] Refers to the group known as the “Houthis” that emerged as an armed group in 2004 when it launched a rebellion against the Yemeni government
[52] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34), 52
[53] Non-International Armed Conflicts in Yemen, Geneva Academy-RULAC (April 15, 2021), https://
www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-armed-conflicts-in-yemen#collapse3accord
[54] Refers to a coalition of nine countries—Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Kuwait and Qatar—that entered the conflict on March 26, 2015 when the coalition announced the launch of a military campaign against Ansar Allah forces and forces loyal to former President Saleh
[55] ICRC Commentary to Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I) (2016), para 259
[56] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34), 22
[57] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34), 205-213
[58] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34), 22
[59] Mwatana for Human Rights & Global Rights Compliance (n 34), 271
[60] Conducted by Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, created pursuant to HRC Resolution A/HRC/RES/36/31, mandate renewed under Resolution A/HRC/RES/39/16
[61] UN HRC ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014’, (10 September 2021), UN Doc A/HRC/48/20 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A-HRC-48-20-AUV.pdf
[62] UN HRC (n 62), para 82
[63] How the Court Works, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/how-the-court-works
[64] Situation in Darfur, Sudan, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur; Situation in Libya, International Criminal Court, https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya
[65] Yemen Accountability Project, Aiding and Abetting: Holding States, Corporations and Individuals Responsible for War Crimes in Yemen (September 2020), 29, 33, 35-36
[66] UN HRC (n 62), para 77
[67] UN HRC ‘There is nothing left for us: starvation as a method of warfare in South Sudan’, (5 October 2020), UN Doc A/HRC/45/CRP.3 https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/there-nothing-left-us-starvation-method-warfare-south-sudan-conference-room-paper
[68] GRC and WPF ‘Accountability for Starvation Crimes: South Sudan’, Policy Brief No. 2 June 2019, para 7 https://starvationaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Accountability-for-Starvation-South-Sudan.pdf
[69] UN HRC (n 68)
[70] Established by the UN HRC under Resolution 31/20
[71] UN HRC, ‘Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’, (4 February 2021), UN Doc A/HRC/46/53, para 48 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session46/Documents/A_HRC_46_53.pdf; See also: UN HRC, ‘Detailed findings of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan’, (18 February 2021), UN Doc A/HRC/46/CRP.2 https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session46/Documents/A_HRC_46_CRP_2.pdf
[72] UN HRC (n 72), para 49
[73] UN HRC (n 72), para 49
[74] UN HRC (n 72), para 49
[75] UN HRC (n 72), para 50
[76] UN HRC (n 72), para 76
[77] Akande & Gillard (n 10), 779
[78] Akande & Gillard (n 10), 779
[79] Global Rights Compliance (n 45), 24
Very well articulated and researched piece on an aspect of warfare that is intrinsically linked to humanitarian praxis and demands further inquiry and analysis. Very impressive work by the young scholar.